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DISABILITY, THE END OF LIFE, AND WHY THE CONVERSATION IS STILL SO DIFFICULT
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the weeks prior to the symposium on which this volume of the New York Law
School Law Review is based,1 the disability-rights group Not Dead Yet declared on its
blog that the symposium was a “farce” that showed “just how little respect and regard
[the symposium organizers] have for people with disabilities.” 2 The post took special
issue with the third panel of the symposium, of which I was a participant.3 It claimed,
1.

New York Law School Law Review Symposium, Freedom of Choice at the End of Life: Patients’ Rights in a
Shifting Legal and Political Landscape (Nov. 16, 2012). Video recordings of the symposium are available
at http://www.nylslawreview.com/freedom-of-choice-at-the-end-of-life-videos/.

2.

Stephen Drake, N Y Law School—Justice Action Center’s Upcoming Annual Justice Symposium Not Fair to
Disability Advocates, Let Alone “Just”, Not Dead Yet (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.notdeadyet.
org/2012/10/ny-law-school-justice-action-centers-upcoming-annual-justice-symposium-not-fair-todisability-advocates-let-alone-just.html.

3.

The post reads in part:
[T]here are multiple and major problems with the third panel of the Symposium. Here’s
the title and description of that section:
Panel III: Special People, Special Issues
This panel will discuss the issues of concern for people with disabilities
and the conflict between organizations dedicated to protecting their
rights and end-of-life advocates. The panel will discuss the views of
some of the major religion (sic) and whether conservative theological
values can co-exist with patient choice. Finally, the panel will conclude
with a discussion of the quality of medical care provided to prisoners
and how their end of life choices are treated.
The title about “special” people should alert readers immediately that there will be
no disability advocates or activists describing our conflict(s) with so-called “end of life”
advocates. Most of us roll our eyes, make gagging noises or give other subtle cues that
we detest the “special” label when someone uses it around us. This session, btw, is
moderated by yet another board member of Compassion and Choices.
I would bet that the lion’s share of the load in terms of “discussing” the “issues of
concern” that disability activists and advocates have will be the job of panelist Alicia
Ouellette. Ouellette recently published a text on bioethics and disability—apparently
becoming the newest bioethicist who wants to become known as the “disabilityconscious” bioethicist—someone who can relate slanted, distorted and outright ‘straw
man’ versions of disability critiques, concerns and strong objections to both bioethics
and so-called ‘end of life’ advocates. (I’m not linking to her book—I hear it’s not selling
well and it would be nice if it continued on that path.) Suffice it to say, Ouellette gets
many things wrong about disability issues in her book—especially when it comes to
NDY-related issues. Small wonder—she didn’t reach out to anyone we know of (in
checking her preface) in disability advocacy who was actually involved in cases she talks
about in her book—Elizabeth Bouvia, Larry McAfee and Terri Schiavo to name a few.
....
That’s the kind of respect we “special” people can expect from this session.
What makes it all the more appalling is that this will happen under the auspices of
the University’s Justice Action Center. The Center describes its goals, in part, this way:
. . . the Center seeks to instill in students a deeper intellectual
understanding of the law regardless of their final career goals, and to
present opportunities to maintain their ties to the social justice
community beyond law school. Recognizing that students will pursue
varied careers, the Center aims to provide a framework for analyzing
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among other things, that the panel demeaned people with disabilities by virtue of its
title (“Special People, Special Issues”) and its composition (by including Ann
Neumann4 and me, but no members of Not Dead Yet or similar disability-rights
groups). According to the post, the symposium’s sponsors had denied disability
advocates “even a modicum of respect in making sure the perspectives of disability
advocates and activists are represented fairly and accurately.”5 “It’s a shame to see so
many organizations join them in their total disdain for disability activists and
advocates,” the post stated.6 At the event itself, a small group from Not Dead Yet
protested outside the conference hall. They displayed signs and distributed handouts
that repeated the charge that symposium organizers had shown contempt for persons
with disabilities through the content of the presentations.7
Regardless of the merits of the charges made by the disability activists,8 the
presence of disability-rights protesters during an academic conference is noteworthy.
However, such protests are not new. Indeed, forty protesters from Not Dead Yet took

the pervasive questions and contradictions relating to social justice in
American society, irrespective of the context in which they may arise.
The main “contradiction” attendees will see at this symposium is the Justice
Action Center’s failure to show even a modicum of respect in making sure the
perspectives of disability advocates and activists are represented fairly and accurately.
Do I have to add that ‘ justice” [sic] would mean having disability activists themselves
speaking for ourselves?
Shame on the Justice Action Center for showing everyone just how little respect
and regard they have for people with disabilities.
Shame on the sponsors of this farce—the New York Law School Law Review and
the Diane Abbey Law Center for Children and Families, the American Bar Association
Commission on Law and Aging; the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys; the
Elder Law Section of the New York State Bar Association; and Collaborative for
Palliative Care, Westchester/NYS Southern Region.
Id. (quoting description of Panel III at the New York Law School Law Review symposium Freedom of
Choice at the End of Life: Patients’ Rights in a Shifting Legal and Political Landscape, available at http://
www.nylslawreview.com/freedom-of-choice-at-the-end-of-life/); see also Justice Action Center, N.Y.L.
Sch., http://www.nyls.edu/justice-action-center/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
4.

Ann Neumann is a hospice volunteer, and has written for Guernica, the Nation, AlterNet, and other
publications. She edits the Revealer, a publication of the Center for Religion and Media at New York
University, and teaches journalism at Drew University.

5.

Drake, supra note 2.

6.

Id.

7.

See Stephen Drake, NDY Activists Leaflet Justice Action Center (N Y Law School) Featuring Opponents
Discussing “Disability Concerns” Without Including Disability Rights Activists to Speak for Ourselves, Not
Dead Yet (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.notdeadyet.org/2012/11/ndy-activists-leaf let-justice-actioncenter-ny-law-school-featuring-opponents-discussing-disability-concerns-without-includingdisability-rights-activists-to-speak-for-ourselves.html.

8.

As I understand it, New York Law School did reach out to disability-rights advocates to participate in
the symposium, but those invitations were declined. In addition, the panel included two presentations
on inmates and one on disability, which might explain the moniker.
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over a plenary session of one of the first national conferences I helped to organize.9 The
Not Dead Yet blog was also deeply critical of a conference that I organized to engage
disability activists in a conversation about a range of bioethical issues.10 Disability
activists are not alone in contesting discussions favoring choice in dying—some
disability scholars also contend that arguments favoring choice in dying are necessarily
harmful to persons with disabilities.11 The protests are noteworthy nonetheless because
they reveal a deep-seated disconnect between two groups: advocates for choice in dying
and disability-rights activists. Both groups purport to share a commitment to respect
for all individuals, but disability-rights activists argue that advocates for choice in dying
threaten the rights of people with disabilities as individuals.12
This essay seeks to explain the context that gives rise to this disconnect. My
point here is not to debate the merits of the arguments made in opposition to choicein-dying laws. Others have done that.13 My objective is to share what I have learned
9.

See Not Dead Yet!, Ctr. for Disability Rts. (July 13, 2006), http://cdrnys.org/images/oldcdr/20060714ndy.
html.

10.

The post stated:
Give me a break. First of all, there have been several single-shot events by
different entities over the years that accomplished nothing—except perhaps for the
bioethicists who sponsored the events to pat themselves on the back for their one-time
exercise in inclusion. And, having done that, return to exclusion as a matter of standard
operating procedure.
....
The reality is that this “discourse” around bioethics is more than just an exchange
of philosophies, ideas, and experiences. At the core, this is a political struggle over
public policy—a struggle between those who have power and seek to hold onto it and
those directly affected by the policies who want to take power, [sic]
And no one knows it better than the bioethicists who are hosting this event.
Stephen Drake, Disability and Ethics Conference this Weekend—Low Expectations Based on Past
Performance, Not Dead Yet (May 19, 2010), http://www.notdeadyet.org/2010/05/disability-andethics-conference-this.html.

11.

See generally John B. Mitchell, Understanding Assisted Suicide: Nine Issues to Consider
57–104 (2007) (discussing the complex issues of assisted suicide through nine contexts). See, e.g.,
Christopher Newell, Disability, Bioethics, and Rejected Knowledge, 31 J. Med. & Phil. 269, 275 (2006)
(charging that bioethics is a disabling project); Diane Coleman & Tom Nerney, Guardianship and
the Disability Rights Movement 1, available at http://www.centerforself-determination.com/docs/
guard/GuardianshipDisabilityRightsColemanNerney1.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (“[The] powerful
field of bioethics represents the single greatest threat to the welfare of those with significant disabilities
in this country. Under the rubric of utilitarian ethics and the language of rights, discrimination against
people with disabilities has become enshrined in law and popular imagination.”).

12.

The claim is that “legalized medical killing is really about a deadly double standard for people with
severe disabilities, including both conditions that are labeled terminal and those that are not.” Tom
Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs 122 (Routledge 2006) (quoting About Us, Not Dead
Yet (Nov. 30, 2006), http://web.archive.org/web/20061130080647/http://www.notdeadyet.org/docs/
about.html).

13.

See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Law and the Contradictions of the Disability Rights
Movement (2009); Kathy L. Cerminara, Critical Essay: Musings on the Need to Convince Some People
with Disabilities that End-of-Life Decision-Making Advocates Are Not Out to Get Them, 37 Loy. U. Chi.
L.J. 343 (2006); Lois Shepherd, In Respect of People Living in a Permanent Vegetative State—And Allowing
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in a decade of research about why the two groups appear to remain mired in a
permanent conflict that prevents constructive work on achieving the shared goal of
ensuring respect for all persons at the end of life. I will explain why seemingly strong
claims by advocates for choice in dying that procedural rules and precise definitions
(such as those used in Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act)14 protect against
discriminatory applications of laws allowing choice in dying nonetheless fail to
reassure disability activists who worry that the laws will be used to kill people with
disabilities against their will. The short answer: disability activists have good reason
to distrust the health care system in the United States, and until the system is
perceived as more fair and trustworthy they will continue to find inadequate the
argument that procedures safeguard against abuse. To the extent advocates for choice
in dying want to defuse the tension that marks interactions with disability-rights
activists, they must begin to understand and address the marginalizing, stigmatizing,
and discriminatory aspects of the health care system experienced by people with
disabilities throughout their lives. That understanding will go a long way toward
facilitating better and more effective communication between the groups.
Part II of this essay explains how I became involved in the dispute over disability
rights at the end of life, and why I believe that understanding the broader context of
life with disability helps to explain the deep conflict between advocates for choice in
dying and advocates for disability rights. Part III explores the experience of people
with disabilities in the U.S. health care system, including the troubling disparities in
care. Finally, Part IV suggests that by better attending to the systemic disparities
faced by people with disabilities in the health care system, advocates for choice in
dying might begin to break through the distrust and anger that characterize
disability-rights activists’ protests of discussions about choice in dying. Building trust
with members of the disability-rights community is, in my view, an important
element of promoting strong doctor-patient relationships, sound medical policy, and,
most importantly, increased access to physician aid in dying.15 When trust in
physicians and policies that affect the lives of persons with disabilities is eroded, the

Them to Die, 16 Health Matrix 631 (2006); Lois Shepherd, Terri Schiavo and the Disability Rights
Community: A Cause for Concern, 2006 U. Chi. Legal F. 253.
14.

See Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 127.800–897 (West 2013); Washington
Death with Dignity Act, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 70.245.010–904 (West 2013); see also Or.
Health Auth., Death with Dignity Act Requirements, available at http://public.health.oregon.
gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Documents/requirements.
pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (explaining that under Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, a request for
lethal medications can be granted only when the patient is an adult (eighteen years of age or older); is a
resident of Oregon; is capable (defined as able to make and communicate health care decisions); is
diagnosed with a terminal illness that will lead to death within six months; has made two oral requests
of his or her physician separated by at least fifteen days; has provided a written request to his or her
physician, signed in the presence of two witnesses; and the prescribing physician and a consulting
physician have confirmed the diagnosis and prognosis, and determined that the patient is capable).

15.

I present this argument in more depth in my book, Bioethics and Disability: Toward a DisabilityConscious Bioethics (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011).
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prospects for collaboration and consensus around expanded options for all people at
the end of life remain poor.
II. AN ACCIDENTAL INTERLOPER

My interest in the disability-rights community began after I wrote a law review
article16 that discussed the case of Sheila Pouliot.17 I became involved in the Pouliot case
when I was an assistant solicitor general in the Office of the New York Attorney
General. My office represented a state agency that sought to enjoin Pouliot’s family and
doctors from discontinuing the medical provision of nutrition and hydration that was
sustaining her life.18 Pouliot was an adult with profound cognitive and physical
disabilities. At the time, she was terminally ill and unable to digest any food or water
administered orally.19 Pouliot was also being kept alive through intravenous
administration of fluids.20 When her case went to court, New York state law did not
allow family members or doctors to withhold nutrition or hydration from a person who
never had the capacity to make her own decisions.21 Pouliot’s family and doctors
contested the application of New York law, arguing that they should have the right to
terminate Pouliot’s treatment because, although the intravenous fluids were keeping her
alive, they were also causing her intractable pain, bloating, and the deterioration of her
organs.22 The family was ultimately unsuccessful.23 As a result, Pouliot’s death was
agonizingly slow and painful, stretching over the course of months.24 My article was a
criticism of New York’s end-of-life laws, which kept people like Sheila Pouliot alive no
matter the cost.25 I argued specifically that New York law was especially harmful to
people with cognitive disabilities because it deprived them of the right to palliative care,
and exposed them to the risk of the horrific death experienced by Pouliot.26 In my view,
the law’s barrier to medically appropriate comfort care—including cessation of the
provision of medically administered nutrition and hydration—was a form of disability

16.

See Alicia R. Ouellette, When Vitalism Is Dead Wrong: The Discrimination Against and Torture of
Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining Treatment, 79 Ind. L.J. 1 (2004).

17.

Blouin ex rel. Estate of Pouliot v. Spitzer, 356 F.3d 348 (2d Cir. 2004).

18.

See id. at 352–53.

19.

See id. at 352.

20. See id. at 348, 353–54.
21.

See id. at 351.

22.

See id. at 355 & n.4.

23.

See id. at 365 (holding that the decision to discontinue medical treatment must be grounded clearly in
the patient’s expressed intent—“not the desires of surrogates or family members”—and that the state
was within its authority to order the continuation of treatment for as long as possible).

24.

See id. at 351–52.

25.

See Ouellette, supra note 16, at 21–22.

26. See id. at 23–24, 38.
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discrimination. 27 In short, I thought that by advocating for expanded choices for
persons with disabilities at the end of life, I had written a pro-disability article.
I soon learned that some disability-rights activists disagreed. I was surprised (and
upset) to receive angry emails from disability-rights activists, and even angrier responses
in person after I presented the paper at conferences and public talks. The charge was
that, by advocating for a change in New York law to allow for the discontinuation of
medically administered nutrition and hydration in cases involving persons with
cognitive disabilities, I was promoting a new form of eugenics and the discriminatory
notion that lives with disability are not worth living. Eventually, I became something
of a target for disability-rights activists, who appear to take particular issue with my
work and participation in discussions that touch on end-of-life issues.28
The responses from disability-rights activists to my work, and that of other
advocates for choice in dying in cases involving the removal of life-sustaining

27.

See id. at 22–25.

28. See Drake, supra note 2. The Not Dead Yet website states:

Another prominent participant in this event is Alicia Ouellette. If you check out
the link, her publications and presentations show she had developed an aggressive
“interest” in disability and “end of life”—the latter a term she uses frequently without
ever really defining. I first noticed Ouellette when she seemed to show precognitive
ability when she wrote an entry on the bioethics blog titled “Important End-of-Life
Case in Massachusetts Reaches Critical Point.” The entry was about Haleigh Poutre,
an abused 11-year-old girl who was beaten so badly she went into a deep coma. At the
time of Ouellette’s blog entry, the MA Supreme Court hadn’t rendered a verdict to the
challenge of treatment removal on the part of her adoptive stepfather, who no doubt
sought to beat a murder rap. Nevertheless, her situation was referred to as an “end of
life” case by Ouellette. And Ouellette didn’t find it worth revisiting the subject two
months later—after the judge had sanctioned Haleigh’s right to die a “dignified” death,
she began to come out of the coma and is alert and doing well at last report.
Writing in the Oregon Law Review in 2006, Ouellette wrote out her analysis on
“Disability and the End of Life.” In the paper, she accuses activists of conf lating
disability and terminal illness. Leaving a debunking of this aside, I think it’s worth
noting that neither Ouellette nor other mainstream bioethicists have attacked the Final
Exit Network or Compassion & Choices for their very blatant—and successful—
maneuvers to conflate terminal illness and disability (and voluntary vs. involuntary, for
that matter). This article is a goldmine of ad hominem attacks and selective storytelling.
She makes sure to tie disability activists to religious political groups in relation to
Schiavo, but also fails to mention the twenty or so national disability groups that
expressed concerns over Schiavo’s situation and what it meant about dismantled
protections for people under guardianship. She “tells the story” of Elizabeth Bouvia,
but without relating the personal events in her life that might have led any young
woman into a downward slump. She talks brief ly about Larry McAfee but fails to
credit disability advocates as the ones who got him what he wanted in order to live—a
place to live outside of an institution. (CORRECTION: I have reread the article in
question and Ouellette does indeed relate several personal losses and setbacks in
Bouvia’s life cited by disability activists. Later, though, she apparently gives them short
shrift by referring to the “power of choice”—implying giving Bouvia an opportunity to
die with medical assistance empowered her to live.)
Drake, supra note 10.
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treatment and physician aid in dying, 29 persuaded me to learn more about the
experiences of people with disabilities in and out of the health care system. Thus
began a decade-long immersion in disability studies and activism that left me with
many new friends and colleagues, as well as a much deeper understanding of the
history and experiences that have convinced some disability-rights activists that laws
that allow for choice in dying will necessarily work against people with disabilities—
no matter how narrowly or carefully drafted they are.
I also came to understand that where some people perceive both choice in dying
and access to choice in dying as options that respect individual autonomy, others
perceive discrimination based on disability status. This position is not, as is sometimes
claimed, an idea planted by right-wing, right-to-life groups, but rather one based on
a real concern that the health care system does not value life with disability and
would, if possible, simply eliminate people with disabilities.30 This view was evident
in the Terry Schiavo case, about which influential disability scholar Harriet McBryde
Johnson wrote:
The State of Florida would not have authorized a man to have his nondisabled wife deprived of food and hydration, and would not have caused her
death that way. It was because of her disability that her death was thought to
be appropriate. 31
29. See, e.g., Brief for Not Dead Yet et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Gonzales v. Oregon, 546

U.S. 243 (2006) (No. 04-623); Brief for Not Dead Yet et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants,
Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2005) (No. SC04-925); Brief for Not Dead Yet et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Appellants, Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-35587); Brief
for Not Dead Yet et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Wendland v. Wendland, 28 P.3d 151
(Cal. 2001) (No. S087265).
30. See Adrienne Asch, Disability, Bioethics, and Human Rights, in Handbook of Disability Studies 297,

301 (Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds., 2001) (“[T]he first right of people with disabilities is a claim to life
itself, along with the social recognition of the value and validity of the life of someone with a disability.”);
see also The Case Against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care (Kathleen
Foley & Herbert Hendin eds., 2002); AMA Code of Med. Ethics, Opinion 2.211—Physician
Assisted Suicide (June 1996), available at http://ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medicalethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2211.page (“[A]llowing physicians to participate in assisted suicide
would cause more harm than good. Physician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the
physician’s role as healer, would be difficult or impossible to control, and would pose serious societal
risks.”); AMA Code of Med. Ethics, Opinion 2.21—Euthanasia (June 1996), available at http://
ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2211.page
(“Euthanasia could also readily be extended to incompetent patients and other vulnerable populations.”).
31.

Harriet McBryde Johnson: Civil Rights Activist, Ability Mag., available at http://abilitymagazine.com/
harriet_mcbryde.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2013); see also Schindler v. Schiavo (In re Guardianship of
Schiavo), 916 So. 2d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Harriet Johnson, Not Dead at All: Why Congress Was
Right to Stick Up for Terri Schiavo, Slate (Mar. 23, 2005, 7:50 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/hey_wait_a_minute/2005/03/not_dead_at_all.html, reprinted in Harriet McBryde
Johnson, Overlooked in the Shadows, Wash. Post, Mar. 25, 2005, at A19, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64571-2005Mar24.html. Of course, not all disability-rights
advocates oppose choice in dying. See, e.g., Paul K. Longmore, The Disability Rights Opposition to Assisted
Suicide Explained and Critiqued, in End-of-Life Issues and Persons with Disabilities 144, 151
(Timothy Lillie & James L. Werth eds., 2007); Paul K. Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide,
and Social Prejudice, in Why I Burned My Book and Other Essays on Disability 149 (2003); see
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Additionally, the claim that laws facilitating choice in dying are a form of disability
discrimination is evident in the positions taken by the group that protested the
symposium at New York Law School.
After a decade of engaging in disability scholarship and listening to people with
disabilities, I believe it is a mistake to dismiss the positions taken by disability
advocates as fringe or radical. Underlying these positions is a deep-seated distrust of
the U.S. health care system that results from historical and pervasive disparities in
treatment experienced by persons with disabilities. By understanding and addressing
the source of that distrust and the disparities that plague the system, advocates for
choice in dying might be able to break through the conflict to foster constructive
collaborative action.
III. EXPERIENCING DISABILITY IN THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

In May 2012, a mainstream disability-rights organization called the National
Disability Rights Network published a report detailing the ways in which the U.S.
health care system fails to recognize the value of life with disability. 32 The report
describes conversations between doctors and persons with disabilities and their
families in which the disabled are “viewed as having little value as they are,” and are
not considered “fully human, [and therefore not] endowed with inalienable rights of
liberty, privacy and the right to be left alone—solely because they were born with a
disability.”33 The National Disability Rights Network is hardly the first group or
individual to criticize the U.S. health care system for its treatment of persons with
disabilities; such criticisms are widespread in disability scholarship. 34
Outside of the disability community, the notion that the U.S. health care system is
an inhospitable place for people with disabilities might be surprising. This is, after all,
also Adrienne Asch, Recognizing Death While Affirming Life: Can End of Life Reform Uphold a Disabled
Person’s Interest in Continued Life?, in Improving End of Life Care: Why Has It Been So Difficult?
S31 (Bruce Jennings et al. eds., 2005).
32.

See David Carlson, Cindy Smith & Nachama Wilker, Devaluing People with Disabilities:
Medical Procedures That Violate Civil Rights (2012), available at http://disabilitylawva.org/
wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Devaluing_People_with_Disabilities.pdf.

33.

Id. at 5.

34. See, e.g., Harlan Lane, The Mask of Benevolence: Disabling the Deaf Community 212–13

(1992) (discussing the mistreatment of deaf patients in France); Paul K. Longmore, Medical Decision
Making and People with Disabilities: A Clash of Cultures, in Why I Burned My Book and Other Essays
on Disability, supra note 31, at 204–11 (describing conflicts between disabled persons and their health
care providers); Robert Whitaker, Mad in America: Bad Science, Bad Medicine, and the
Enduring Mistreatment of the Mentally Ill 71–72 (Basic Books 2010); Stephen Drake, The
Doctor Said It Would Be Better if I Didn’t Survive, Not Dead Yet (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.
notdeadyet.org/2012/03/stephens_story.html; Diane Coleman & Stephen Drake, Disability
Discrimination, Hastings Ctr. Bioethics F. (July 11, 2012), http://www.thehastingscenter.org/
Bioethicsforum/Post.aspx?id=5913&blogid=140; Ford Vox, ‘The Cyclops Child’: Inhumanity in a 1960
Hospital, The Atlantic (July 14, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/07/thecyclops-child-inhumanity-in-a-1960-hospital/259810/ (recounting Dr. Fredric Neuman’s cruel treatment
of a child with severe birth defects).
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decades after both the passage of civil rights statutes for persons with disabilities35 and
the emergence of disability studies as its own field.36 Nonetheless, disability-based
discrimination persists. For many persons with disabilities, that discrimination is
especially acute in the health care system. The long history of medical mistreatment
of—and insensitivity toward—people with disabilities at the hands of the health care
establishment is well documented by disability and legal scholars. 37 This history
includes institutionalization,38 eugenics,39 forced sterilization,40 and leaving newborns
with correctable conditions to die.41 While these practices are now disfavored,
individuals with disabilities continue to face discrimination in its modern form in
medical offices and hospitals,42 leaving some of these individuals fearful that the health
35.

See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).

36. See generally Handbook of Disability Studies (Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds., 2001); The Disability

Studies Reader (Lennard J. Davis ed., 3d ed. 2010).
37.

See, e.g., Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the Supreme Court,
and Buck v. Bell 45 (2008); The New Disability History: American Perspectives (Paul K.
Longmore & Lauri Umansky eds., 2001); William J. Peace, Comfort Care as Denial of Personhood, 42:4
Hastings Ctr. Rep. 14 (2012); Joseph P. Shapiro, No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a
New Civil Rights Movement (Broadway Books 1994); Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in Disability,
Difference, Discrimination: Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Public Policy 13, 42
(1998); Carol J. Gill, Becoming Visible: Personal Health Experiences of Women with Disabilities, in Women
with Physical Disabilities: Achieving and Maintaining Health and Well-Being 5 (Danuta
M. Krotoski et al. eds., 1996).

38. See Richard K. Scotch, American Disability Policy in the Twentieth Century, in The New Disability

History, 375, 377–78 (Paul K. Longmore & Lauri Umansky eds., 2001).
39.

See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Questions existed about the heritability of conditions and
whether the patients actually had the suspect conditions. For example, research indicates that Carrie
Buck was not in fact mentally handicapped. See Roberta M. Berry, From Involuntary Sterilization to
Genetic Enhancement: The Unsettled Legacy of Buck v. Bell, 12 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y
401, 420–21 (1998); Michael G. Silver, Note, Eugenics and Compulsory Sterilization Laws: Providing
Redress for the Victims of a Shameful Era in United States History, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 862, 867 (2004).

40. See, e.g., Philip R. Reilly, The Surgical Solution: A History of Involuntary Sterilization in

the United States 30–40 (1991); Silver, supra note 39, at 867.
41.

See Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (2d Dep’t 1983). The “Baby Doe” cases were
explored by a presidential commission, which issued a report in 1983 that would disallow denial of
surgery to “an otherwise healthy Down Syndrome child whose life is threatened by a surgically
correctable complication.” Asch, supra note 30, at 303 (quoting President’s Comm’n for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Med. & Biomed. & Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego LifeSustaining Treatment: Ethical, Medical and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 6–7
(1983)). See also Dennis F. Cantrell, Bowen v. American Hospital Association: Federal Regulation Is
Powerless to Save Baby Doe, 19 Ind. L. Rev. 1199 (1986) (discussing a case in which a boy, born with
Down syndrome and esophageal obstruction, died because his parents refused to consent to life-saving
treatment); Armand Matheny Antommaria, “Who Should Survive?: One of the Choices on Our Conscience”:
Mental Retardation and the History of Contemporary Bioethics, 16 Kennedy Inst. of Ethics J. 205 (2006)
(discussing a film that “contains a dramatization of the death of an infant with Down syndrome as a
result of the parents’ decision to not have congenital intestinal obstruction surgically corrected”).

42.

See Staring Back: The Disability Experience From the Inside Out (Kenny Fries ed., 1997);
Kenny Fries, The History of My Shoes and the Evolution of Darwin’s Theory (2007);
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care system is a dangerous place. Disability-rights scholar and cultural anthropologist
William Peace explains: “Most people with a disability fear even the most routine
hospitalization. We do not fear any of the commonplace indignities those without a
disability worry about when hospitalized. Our fear is primal—will our lives be
considered devoid of value?”43
A variety of medical innovations make disability-rights advocates very
uncomfortable. For example, controversial procedures such as genetic screening and
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis can be used to prevent people with disabilities
from even being born.44 There are also growth attenuation procedures for children
with disabilities that were modeled on the “Ashley X” case.45 Ashley was a six-yearold girl from Seattle who was given high doses of estrogen in order to stunt her
growth; she underwent both a hysterectomy and a mastectomy in order to keep her
small, so that she could be treated at home.46 There are cases in which health
providers unilaterally decide to withdraw treatment from children and adults with
disabilities.47 There have been attempts at rationing health care resources based in
part on disability status, such as in Oregon, where the federal government eventually
found that the proposed scheme would unlawfully discriminate against people with
disabilities.48 And there are reports that fertility clinics routinely deny their services
to people with disabilities.49

Harriet McBryde Johnson, Too Late to Die Young: Nearly True Tales from a Life (2005);
Peace, supra note 37, at 14.
43.

William J. Peace, Disability Discrimination: The Author Responds, Hastings Ctr. Bioethics F. (July
27, 2012), http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Bioethicsforum/Post.aspx?id=5935&blogid=140 #ixzz22
VbDNxiW.

44. See Bonnie Steinbeck, Disability Prenatal Testing and Selective Abortion, in Prenatal Testing and

Disability Rights 108 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000); Deborah Kaplan & Marsha
Saxton, Disability Community and Identity: Perceptions of Prenatal Screening, Our Bodies Ourselves,
http://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/book/companion.asp?id=31&compID=43&page=2 (last visited
Dec. 20, 2013).
45.

See Carlson, Smith & Wilker, supra note 32.

46. See Alicia Ouellette, Growth Attentuation, Parental Choice, and the Rights of Disabled Children: Lessons

from the Ashley X Case, 8 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 207, 211–12 (2008), available at http://www.law.
uh.edu/hjhlp/Issues/Vol_82/Ouellette.pdf.
47.

See Ouellette, supra note 15, at 105–08 (describing the case of Emilio Gonzalez, a child with Leigh’s
disease whose doctors terminated medical care and provided only comfort care, despite the wishes of
Emilio’s mother).

48. See Dan Brock, Health Care Resource Prioritization and Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities, in

Americans with Disabilities: Implications for Individuals and Institutions 1, 3–4 (Leslie
Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000); Lisa L. Dahm, Medical Futility and the Texas Medical Futility
Statute: A Model to Follow or One to Avoid?, 6 Health Law. 25, 28 (2008).
49. See Nat’l Council on Disability, Rocking the Cradle: Ensuring the Rights of Parents with

Disabilities and Their Children 205 (2012), available at http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2012/
Sep272012/; see also Barbara Faye Waxman, Up Against Eugenics: Disabled Women’s Challenge to Receive
Reproductive Health Services, 12 Sexuality & Disability 155 (1994).
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Beyond controversial medical innovations, disability-rights advocates are even
more troubled by the day-to-day experience of persons with disabilities in the health
care system. A report published in 2009 by the National Council on Disabilities
found that people with disabilities experience significant health care disparities and
barriers to care.50 People with disabilities are more likely to go without needed care;
they make more preventable emergency room visits and hospitalizations; they
experience a significantly higher prevalence of secondary conditions; they get less
preventive care—fewer pelvic exams, fewer pap smears, fewer prostate exams, less
prenatal care; they are not as likely to be weighed when they go to the doctor; and
they have poor health outcomes.51 The statistics reveal a disparity similar to the
disparity that is well recognized with respect to race and health care.52 Researchers
are just beginning to recognize and document the depth of disability-based disparities
in health care.53
Many factors contribute to disability-based disparities in health care, including
the cost of care.54 In addition, there are also communication barriers,55 architectural
barriers, problems with accessible medical equipment, and stereotypes about
disabilities.56 Understanding how these barriers affect the day-to-day experience of
people with disabilities in the health care setting will help to explain the reluctance
50. See Nat’l Council on Disability, supra note 49.
51.

See id.; Elizabeth Pendo, Reducing Disparities Through Health Care Reform: Disability and Accessible
Medical Equipment, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 1057, 1059–60; Karen Hwang et al., Access and Coordination of
Health Care Service for People with Disabilities, 20 J. Disability Pol’y Stud. 28, 29–30 (2009) (collecting
results of population-based surveys); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Surgeon
General’s Call to Action to Improve the Health and Wellness of Persons with
Disabilities (2005), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/calls/disabilities/calltoaction.
pdf; Ctr. for Research on Women with Disabilities, Health Disparities Between Women with Physical
Disabilities and Women in the General Population, Baylor C. Med. (May 2005), https://www.bcm.edu/
research/centers/research-on-women-with-disabilities/?PMID=1331 (discussing the first national
survey of women with disabilities on their experiences with women’s health care conducted in the years
immediately following the passage of the ADA).

52.

See Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Acads., Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic
Disparities in Health Care (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003), available at http://www.nap.edu/
openbook.php?isbn=030908265X.

53.

See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Access to Medical
Care for Individuals with Mobility Disabilities 8–19 (2010), available at http://www.ada.gov/
medcare_mobility_ta/medcare_ta.pdf.

54. See generally Kirsten L. Kirschner, Mary Lou Breslin & Lisa I. Iezzoni, Structural Impairments that

Limit Access to Health Care for Patients with Disabilities, 297:10 JAMA 1121 (2007).
55.

See Michael A. Schwartz, Deaf Patients, Doctors, and the Law: Compelling a Conversation About
Communication, 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 947 (2008) (describing the difficulties experienced by deaf
patients who are not provided sign language interpreters by their doctors).

56. See Elizabeth Pendo, Disability, Equipment Barriers, and Women’s Health: Using the ADA to Provide

Meaning ful Access, 2 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 15, 17–18 (2008) (describing barriers posed by
inaccessible buildings and medical equipment); Elizabeth Pendo, Shifting the Conversation: Disability,
Disparities and Health Care Reform, 6 Fla. Int’l U. L. Rev. 87, 92 (2010) (noting that “twenty years
after passage of the [ADA], many people with mobility impairments cannot get on examination tables
and chairs, cannot be weighed, and cannot use x-ray and other imaging equipment”).
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of some disability advocates to trust the system to prevent the abuse of choice-indying laws at the end of life.
Consider, for example, “equipment barriers.” Medical equipment—examination
tables, weight scales, x-ray and mammography equipment—is often not accessible to
people with mobility disabilities.57 Mammography equipment, for instance, is
designed so that women must stand up to position their breasts in the machine for
scanning.58 As a result, women with mobility disabilities cannot get screening
mammograms, except when they happen to have access to an adjustable machine.59
Consequently, the data shows that women with mobility disabilities are being
diagnosed with breast cancer at a more advanced stage than people who can stand up
and make use of the more common inaccessible screeners.60 Similarly, women with
mobility disabilities face equipment-based challenges getting pap smears; because
the tables are not accessible, they are not screened.61 Imagine the frustration that
people with mobility disabilities must feel when they are told—more than two
decades after the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was passed—that certain
screening tests are not available because medical equipment remains inaccessible.
If the problem was only inaccessible medical equipment, the barriers to care for
people with disabilities would be eminently fixable. Unfortunately, attitudinal barriers
are also affecting care. People with disabilities face negative stereotypes and
assumptions about the tragedy and limitations of life with a disability.62 These negative
57.

See June Isaacson Kailes, The Patient’s Perspective on Access to Medical Equipment, in Medical
Instrumentation: Accessibility and Usability Considerations 3, 6 (Jack M. Winters & Molly
Follette Story eds., 2007); Pendo, Disability, Equipment Barriers, and Women’s Health: Using the ADA to
Provide Meaning ful Access, supra note 56, at 17–18.

58. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 53, at 17; Pendo,

Disability, Equipment Barriers, and Women’s Health: Using the ADA to Provide Meaning ful Access, supra
note 56, at 17–18.
59.

See Nancy Mele, Jeanne Archer, & Burton D. Pusch, Access to Breast Cancer Screening Services for Women
with Disabilities, 34 J. Obstetric, Gynecological & Neonatal Nursing 4, 453–64 (2005), available
at http://www.memphis.edu/nursing/Suha/Mele.pdf; see also Women with Disabilities and Breast Cancer:
Know Your Rights, Indep. Care Sys., http://www.icsny.org/sitemanagement/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/
Beast-Cancer-Flyer_FINAL.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).

60. See Nat’l Council on Disability, supra note 49, at 57–58; Ellen P. McCarthy et al., Disparities in

Breast Cancer Treatment and Survival for Women with Disabilities, 145 Annals Internal Med. 637
(2006).
61.

The problem of inaccessible medical equipment has not gone unnoticed by lawmakers. Because the
ADA did not solve the problem as intended, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a 2010 guidance
document about accessibility to health care that mentioned equipment. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 53, at 8–19. In 2012, the DOJ issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking “to ensure that medical diagnostic equipment, including examination tables,
examination chairs, weight scales, mammography equipment, and other imaging equipment used by
healthcare providers for diagnostic purposes are accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.”
Medical Diagnostic Equipment Accessibility Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 6916, 6917 (proposed Feb. 9,
2012) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 1195).

62. See Pendo, Disability, Equipment Barriers, and Women’s Health: Using the ADA to Provide Meaning ful

Access, supra note 56, at 44, 55.
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assumptions affect their health care in ways that are far more intractable than
inaccessible examination tables. Descriptions of dehumanizing experiences in health
care settings are all too frequent in disability scholarship.63 People with mobility
disabilities describe their experiences in doctors’ offices as dehumanizing. Despite
their interest in living full lives, having children, and enjoying sexual relationships,
people with disabilities report that providers focus so intently on their impairment
that they disregard the possibility that their patients have more global needs.64 Women
with mobility disabilities report that they must be trailblazers in order to get the kind
of reproductive health care that they want. As scholar Carol Gill explains:
[W]omen with disabilities are stripped of our roles. We are not expected to
be workers, romantic partners, caregivers, or mothers. Socially, we are in
limbo—not quite children, but not adults; not men, but not real women
either. It is difficult to get your bearings and struggle out from under that
kind of unremitting yet subtle oppression, because it steals from you the very
sense of self you need in order to fight.65

Disability scholarship also demonstrates that doctors consistently underestimate
the quality of life one can have with disabilities.66 When asked to evaluate the quality
of life of disabled patients, doctors are significantly more negative than the individuals
who live with impairment; they make negative assumptions about the possible quality
of life with disability that are simply inaccurate.67 This misperception about how
people experience their own lives plays out in painful ways. William Peace offers an
example. Peace is well published,68 writing a powerful blog advocating for social
justice for persons with disabilities.69 He kayaks, skis, and drives. He also uses a
wheelchair to get around. One day, Peace’s middle school-aged son lacerated his arm,
and Peace brought him to the emergency room to get stitches. Although Peace was
sitting next to his son when the health provider came in, the provider looked right
past him to the young boy and asked who should be called about the boy’s medical

63. See, e.g., Nat’l Council on Disability, supra note 49; Fries, supra note 42, at 1–2; McBryde Johnson,

supra note 42, at 1; Kailes, supra note 57, at 5; Waxman, supra note 49, at 155–56, 159, 165; Staring
Back: The Disability Experience from the Inside Out, supra note 42, at 2, 4.
64. See Gill, supra note 37, at 6; see also Waxman, supra note 49.
65.

Gill, supra note 37, at 6.

66. See G.L. Albrecht & P.J. Deulieger, The Disability Paradox: High Quality of Life Against All Odds, 48:8

Soc. Sci. & Med. 977 (1999); J.R. Bach & M.C. Tilton, Life Satisfaction and Well-Being Measures in
Ventilator Assisted Individuals with Traumatic Tetraplegia, 75:6 Arch. Phys. Med. Rehabilitation 626
(1994); S. Saigal et. al., Self-Perceived Health Status and Health Related Quality of Life of Extremely LowBirth-Weight Infants at Adolescence, 276:6 JAMA 453 (1996).
67.

See Nat’l Council on Disability, supra note 49, at 57, 304; Kailes, supra note 57, at 5; Albrecht &
Deulieger, supra note 66; Bach & Tilton, supra note 66; Saigal et. al., supra note 66.

68. See, e.g., Peace, supra notes 37, 43.
69. William J. Peace, Bad Cripple, http://badcripple.blogspot.com/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2013).
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care. The provider did not even consider the possibility that the man in the wheelchair
might have been a parent, which left Peace feeling less than fully human.70
The kind of dismissive attitude experienced by Peace in that emergency room is
representative of the day-to-day experiences in the health care setting reported by
people with disabilities. Individuals cannot get on examination tables for necessary
exams and cannot be weighed.71 They have to convince surprised doctors that they
need reproductive health care because they are sexually active.72 They have to go to
court to enforce their right to a sign language interpreter for communication with
doctors.73 These situations illustrate a pattern of barriers that leaves some people with
disabilities feeling marginalized, stigmatized, and viewed as tragically flawed. Such
experiences erode their trust in the health care system, and such eroded trust affects
discussions about choice in dying.
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT OF LIFE WITH DISABILITY TO ADVANCE
DISCUSSIONS ABOUT CHOICE AT THE END OF LIFE

Advocates for choice-in-dying laws often counter the concern that such laws will
be abused to kill persons with disabilities with assurances that procedural safeguards
will prevent this type of abuse.74 For example, choice-in-dying advocates ask people
to trust that the procedures that limit access to physician aid in dying (e.g., firm
diagnosis of terminal condition, confirmed assessment by multiple providers, etc.),75
will ensure that no one would be forced to accept unwanted aid in dying. Procedural
rules are carefully designed and enshrined in law so that aid-in-dying laws are not
used to eliminate vulnerable populations (including people with disabilities)76 who
have not met the diagnostic criteria or made a clear, unequivocal choice to control
the time and manner of death.77 It thus seems reasonable to reassure disability
advocates that physician aid-in-dying laws are not targeted at them. In Oregon, for
example, aid in dying is available for only competent, terminally ill adults who have
a confirmed diagnosis of less than six months to live and have made multiple requests
(including a witnessed written request) for the lethal prescription.78

70. I relate this story in my book. See Ouellette, supra note 15, at 200.
71.

See Nat’l Council on Disability, supra note 49.

72. See id. at 59.
73. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 55, at 981.
74.

See Margaret Battin, Physician-Assisted Dying and the Slippery Slope: The Challenge of Empiricil Evidence,
45 Willamette L. Rev. 91, 99 (2008). Choice-in-dying advocates also point to statistics demonstrating
the effectiveness of the safeguards. See Anne Marie Su, Note, Physician Assisted Suicide: Debunking the
Myths Surrounding the Elderly, Poor, and Disabled, 10 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 145, 157 (2013).

75. See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 127.897 (West 2013).
76. See id. § 127.805(2).
77.

See id. § 127.897.

78. See id.

385

DISABILITY, THE END OF LIFE, AND WHY THE CONVERSATION IS STILL SO DIFFICULT

Such assurances provide little comfort in the context of an untrustworthy health
care system. As discussed above, assurances of screening tests and preventive care in
the current system have not been realized for people with mobility disabilities.
Assurances of equal access to care have not been met for disabled women seeking
reproductive health care. Assurances of respect for individuals have not been met by
providers who dismiss the notion that a disabled person can be a parent. The breach
of trust experienced at other points in the health care system affects conversations
about end-of-life decisionmaking.
Conversations initiated in this context, especially conversations about terminating
treatment or facilitating death, can raise primal fears in patients with disabilities.79
Persons with disabilities and their allies may question whether conversations about
terminating treatment mean that the doctor thinks that a disabled life is no longer
worth living. These individuals may wonder whether a conversation is really about a
current condition or whether it is based on the same misassumptions that led other
providers to believe that the person with a disability could not be a parent or was not
worthy of screening tests.80 The larger context of a lifetime of experience in the medical
setting helps to explain the skeptical response of people with disabilities to wellmeaning discussions about choices for death. Discussions that look perfectly reasonable
and non-threatening to advocates for choice in dying can feel very threatening to
someone who comes from a context in which the system cannot be trusted.
For this reason, advocates for choice in dying might better serve their cause by
listening to—and learning from—people with disabilities about their experiences in
the health care system, and then advocating for systemic change. In order to break the
impasse between advocates for choice in dying and disability advocates (an impasse
that has played a role in stalling the adoption of choice-in-dying laws around the
country), advocates for choice in dying would be well served by working to reshape
the legal and health care system more broadly to ensure that it respects people with
disabilities while they are living. Committing to a system that respects people of all
abilities throughout their lives will help those of us who are committed to building a
system that respects all of our choices at the time of our deaths. Part of this task
involves questioning assumptions about the quality of life experienced by people with
disabilities—and making changes to the way we discuss disability-related cases.
For example, consider the classic California case Bouvia v. Superior Court,81
which is included in most textbooks on bioethics, health law, and end-of-life issues.
It is the seminal case used to teach the principle that individuals have the right to
refuse treatment—even life-saving, medically administered nutrition and hydration.
Bouvia involved a twenty-eight-year-old woman who had cerebral palsy and arthritis,
was in a wheelchair and incontinent, and used a nasogastric (NG) tube for feeding.82
During a hospitalization, she requested that the NG tube be removed and that she
79. See Peace, supra note 43.
80. See id.
81.

225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986).

82. See id. at 297, 299–300.
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be provided comfort care by the hospital while death from starvation occurred.83 The
case went to court and she was granted that right.84 The court rejected the argument
that withdrawing treatment was a form of suicide.85 Finding Bouvia competent and
that tube-feeding was a form of medical treatment, the court emphasized the
importance of the right to self-determination:
Elizabeth Bouvia’s decision to forego medical treatment or life-support
through a mechanical means belongs to her. It is not a medical decision for
her physicians to make. Neither is it a legal question whose soundness is to be
resolved by lawyers or judges. It is not a conditional right subject to approval
by ethics committees or courts of law. It is a moral and philosophical decision
that, being a competent adult, is hers alone.86

After detailing the physical elements of Bouvia’s disability, the court further
explained that it would be “monstrous” to extend her life.87 The court also explained
that Bouvia’s decision that her life had no meaning was reasonable: “Her mind and
spirit may be free to take great flights but she herself is imprisoned, and must lie
physically helpless subject to the ignominy, embarrassment, humiliation and
dehumanizing aspects created by her helplessness.”88 Thus, the judge asserted that
disability had ruined Bouvia’s life: “Such life has been physically destroyed and its
quality, dignity and purpose [are] gone.”89
83. See id.
84. See id. at 307. Elizabeth Bouvia chose not to end her life after the court granted her wish to die. She

explained her decision during a 60 Minutes segment broadcast on September 7, 1997:
Mike Wallace: (voiceover) After several attempt[s] at starvation, Elizabeth told us, it
just became physically too difficult to do. She didn’t want to die a slow, agonizing
death, nor to do it in the spotlight of public scrutiny. And she told us, with great regret,
she quietly chose to live.
Ms. Bouvia: Starvation is not an easy way to go.
Wallace: Oh, no.
Ms. Bouvia: You can’t just keep doing it and keep doing it. It really messes up your
body. And my body was already messed up.
Jerry Menikoff, Law and Bioethics: An Introduction 262 (Geo. Univ. Press 2001).
85. See Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305–06.
86. Id. at 305.
87.

Id.

88. Id.
89. Id. Such language is not infrequent in legal cases. In a 1996 decision that supported physician-assisted

suicide, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit portrayed life with disabilities as hopeless by
referring to people with physical impairments as existing in “a childlike state of helplessness” exemplified
by physical immobility or by their use of diapers to deal with incontinence. Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 814 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997); see also State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651, 651 (Ga. 1989) (describing the plaintiff, a ventilatordependent man who had been needlessly housed in a hospital intensive care unit for months as being
“incapable of spontaneous respiration, and . . . dependent upon a ventilator to breathe” and stating that,
“[a]ccording to the record, there is no hope that Mr. McAfee’s condition will improve with time, nor is
there any known medical treatment which can improve his condition”).
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What the judge did not mention was the context of the case.90 Bouvia had been a
graduate student, and she had been kicked out of school because, according to the
dean, the school could not handle the difficulty of dealing with a student who had
her physical conditions.91 On top of that, Bouvia’s husband had left her. She had lost
her house and had a miscarriage.92 There were many difficult things happening in
Bouvia’s life that made her life seem hopeless, but none of them were her disability.
She lived a full and rewarding life with the disability for many years.
Thus the Bouvia case rests on and perpetuates faulty assumptions about
disabilities. Disability scholars and activists recognized the faulty assumptions
behind the case long ago.93 But legal scholars and choice-in-dying activists continue
to cite the case uncritically for the proposition that individuals have the right to
refuse life-sustaining care. A discussion of the Bouvia case would be richer if it
included the context in which Bouvia found herself, instead of implicitly confirming
the humiliation that attends physical disability. As disability scholars point out, it is
important to remember that Bouvia did not experience her life as monstrous when
she was a graduate student who was married and pregnant. Perhaps a recognition of
the context would give rise to a more broadly focused search for solutions—better
housing, more social support—as alternatives to medically assisted death.
Recognizing the context surrounding these cases might also diffuse some of the
tension between disability activists and choice-in-dying advocates. It was after
Bouvia that disability scholars and activists started to openly question whether such
cases were really about autonomy—a principle cherished by the community—or
about a new eugenics.94 They argued, “[The nondisabled public] readily concludes
that the disabled person’s wish to die is reasonable because it agrees with their own
preconception that the primary problem for such individuals is the unbearable
experience of a permanent disability. . . . If permanent disability is the problem,
death is the solution.”95 These arguments are the direct precursors to the argument
used in opposition to laws that would expand choice in dying: “[W]hen the
nondisabled say they want to die, they are labeled as suicidal; if they are disabled, it
is treated as ‘natural’ or ‘reasonable.’” 96
Continued uncritical reliance on Bouvia as a seminal case perpetuates this line of
argument. Based on principles of autonomy and self-determination, the judge reached
the correct decision in Bouvia by recognizing the right of individuals to refuse
unwanted medical treatment. Yet the assumptions about life with disability on which
90. See Asch, supra note 30, at 311.
91.

See id.

92.

See id.

93.

See id.

94. See Stanley S. Herr et al., No Place to Go: Refusal of Life-Sustaining Treatment by Competent Persons with

Physical Disabilities, 8 Issues L. & Med. 3, 36 (1992).
95. Carol J. Gill, Suicide Intervention for Persons with Disabilities: A Lesson in Inequality, 8 Issues L. & Med.

37, 39 (1996).
96. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 1995).

388

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 58 | 2013/14

the decision rested are flawed. One step toward changing the legal and medical
systems to better respect persons with disabilities would be to question such
assumptions about the tragedy of life with disability. Becoming familiar with the
teachings of disability experts would go a long way toward broadening our
understanding of life with disability and its many possibilities. Perhaps it is also time
to look for a different paradigm case.
In order to develop the skills and knowledge needed to question (mis)assumptions
about life with disability that alienate disability activists, it will be necessary to better
educate medical and legal professionals about disability issues and about the way that
people with disabilities value their own lives (i.e., develop cultural competencies in
disability).97 There is also a need to diversify the health care workforce to increase the
number of physicians with disabilities so that the population of medical providers
better ref lects the general population, and so that persons with disabilities see
individuals like themselves as part of the health care system.98 And, while contentious,
it is likely necessary that advocates for choice in dying will need to work together with
disability advocates and listen more closely to their concerns about end-of-life cases.
V. CONCLUSION

End-of-life issues take place in the broad context of people’s lives. Recognizing
that the lived experience of people with disabilities often includes negative encounters
and discrimination in the health care system may help to explain why conversations
about expanding choice-in-dying laws are so difficult for many disability advocates.
The fierce opposition by disability advocates to laws that would expand choice in
dying will likely continue so long as such laws depend upon a health care system that
has not proven itself trustworthy. Developing an inclusive health care system in
which all participants deeply understand disability-related issues and work together
against disability discrimination will help engender the trust necessary for a system
that provides options at the end of life. At minimum, that understanding will help
make room for constructive conversation by bringing disability advocates to the table.
By respecting the lives that able-bodied and disabled individuals live, choice-indying advocates will be better able to expand laws that allow for respectful deaths.

97.

As disability scholar Lennard Davis notes, “[T]o be ignorant of disability studies is simply to be
ignorant.” Lennard J. Davis, The Disability Studies Reader, at xii (Routledge 3d ed. 2010).

98. See Alcia R. Ouellette, Patients to Peers: Barriers and Opportunites for Doctors with Disabilities, 13 Nev.

L.J. 645 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2147902.
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